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Abstract
In 1791, amidst growing anxiety about British encroachment on its fur trade with the 
Qing Empire, the Russian government discovered that Britain was sending a large and 
important embassy to Beijing, led by Lord Macartney. In an attempt to derail the nego-
tiations, Russia enrolled the Polotsk Jesuits in a plot to convince the Qing of the nefari-
ousness of British designs. The conspiracy was not a success, despite Macartney’s 
failure. The Jesuits both in Belarus and Beijing continued to play a central role in 
Russia’s geopolitical plans in the region for the next decade and a half, although ulti-
mately the project to establish a Russian Jesuit college in the Qing capital failed. Using 
Russian as well as Jesuit archival sources, the article reconstructs the secret plans, mis-
haps, and miscalculations that shaped this unusual relationship.
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Jesuits have often been accused of being puppet masters. In the eighteenth 
century, they were held responsible for everything from religious obscurantism 
in France to enlightened sedition in Spain; in the nineteenth, they would join 
the Freemasons at the heart of the most fashionable conspiracy theories of 
their day. Here I will tell a different story. On the cusp of the two centuries, 
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when the Society was still officially banned around the world, the Jesuits really 
were involved in a conspiracy—but they were the willing pawns, not the mas-
ter manipulators. The plot was put into action by an empire indifferent to their 
religious aims, Russia, and aimed against Britain, a state actively suspicious of 
their existence. It was meant to have taken months, but stretched out over 
decades, and received its quietus only at the hands of a supposedly friendly 
papacy. Most incongruously of all, its central prize was control over the North 
Pacific fur trade with China, but its consequences redounded all the way to the 
Potomac River.
All of these features run against the grain of contemporary scholarship on 
the Jesuits. Even though they have largely cast off “apology and polemic,” as 
John W. O’Malley pointed out in 1999, in favor of a polyvalent approach to the 
Jesuit role in a wide range of fields and geographical locations, studies of the 
Jesuits understandably continue to place the Society and its religious or scien-
tific mission at the center of the narrative.1 Such an approach has meant that 
this story, too, has been told (most recently, in an article by Marek Inglot, 
Figure 1 Northeast Asia in the eighteenth century.
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following suggestions in his earlier book) on the basis of scanty and incom-
plete Jesuit sources.2 The scattered but wide-ranging, often formerly secret, 
materials in Russian archives dealing with Jesuit involvement in East Asian 
affairs, by contrast, reveal the Jesuits as marginal but deeply engaged actors in 
the complex geopolitics of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
This strange conspiracy, in other words, can demonstrate the value of a less 
Jesuit-centric perspective on a topic which seems so deeply in the purview of 
Jesuit historians.
The Russian fur trade with the Qing Empire, and its vulnerability to British 
takeover, was rooted in the unique circumstances of the Russo-Qing encoun-
ter. In the second half of the seventeenth century, Manchu armies defeated 
would-be Russian colonizers when the two empires met along the Amur 
River. The 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, in which Jesuits in the service of the 
Kangxi emperor played a major role as translators and go-betweens, rolled 
back Russian expansion in the region but legalized Russo-Chinese trade 
both by caravans and along the border.3 The Qing realm rapidly became one 
of the foremost destinations for Siberian and North Pacific furs, even after 
the 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta restricted border trade to the entrepôts of Kiakhta 
and Tsurukhaitu (the latter was largely moribund) and after the caravans 
terminated in 1755. In the eighteenth century Kiakhta, located on the 
Mongolian border southeast of Lake Baikal, may have accounted for a tenth 
of Russia’s total foreign trade, despite the underdeveloped infrastructure 
and minuscule population of eastern Siberia.4 But Qing foreign policy gen-
erally regarded trade as a boon to be granted to foreigners on the condition 
of their good behavior. When Russians were perceived to be acting “stub-
born” or disagreed with Qing officials in Mongolia about the resolution of 
border disputes, smuggling incidents, or criminal cases, the trade was often 
halted completely.5
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One such interruption took place in 1785. Russia refused to execute a bandit 
named Uladzai who had plundered and killed a Chinese merchant, arguing 
that the death penalty had been abolished in the Russian Empire. Qing offi-
cials found this reasoning specious and marked the end of the trade with a 
symbolic cannon shot, which led Catherine the Great to make hasty prepara-
tions for war.6 Though no hostilities took place, the trade remained firmly 
closed until a new treaty addendum was signed in 1792. Meanwhile, a small 
British East India Company ship called the Lark arrived in Kamchatka and 
offered the local commander its services in transporting and selling Russian 
furs in Canton (Guangzhou) while the trade was closed. East India Company 
archives mention nothing about this ship, which suggests it not explicitly 
authorized by the London headquarters. The Siberian governor was enthusias-
tic, but it seems clear that the prospect of British penetration into the North 
Pacific inspired terror in Russian officials, who began to see a future in which 
Great Britain would use the trade interruption to supplant Russia in furs just as 
it had gradually overmatched its European competitors in the Canton trade 
after the 1750s.7 Given sufficient investment, naval trade was capable of far out-
matching Kiakhta in volume, since the latter was remote from the Russian as 
well as the Chinese economic heartlands. The Russian fear of the British was 
ultimately based on a misapprehension. Although the East India Company did 
send a few exploratory voyages to the northwestern coast of North America in 
the mid-1780s, it would largely be American traders who would eventually 
dominate the fur trade in Canton.8
Yet events only seemed to reinforce Russian suspicions. The British presence 
in the Canton trade had been growing steadily since the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, but the East India Company was unhappy with the trading disadvantages 
imposed on its Canton merchants, who also had no permission to trade at any 
other Qing port. An embassy led by Lord Cathcart (1760–1788) was prepared 
starting in 1787 and equipped with instructions to seek a “new establishment” 
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between 27 and 30° N (roughly Zhejiang province), but was aborted due to 
Cathcart’s premature death.9 Lord Macartney (1737–1806), who had been the 
ambassador to Russia in the 1760s, was appointed to replace him in 1791. His 
brief was even more expansive. In addition to remedying the complaints of 
Canton merchants and seeking for a new trading port north of Canton, he was 
to promote British manufactures, find a profitable way of abolishing the 
Cohong (gonghang) merchant guild, and obtain a permanent residence for a 
British agent and students in Beijing. Above all, the directors instructed him, 
“We apprehend that it will be a most desirable circumstance to impress the 
minds of the Chinese with a favorable opinion of the Embassy, this Country 
and its commerce, which must produce the happiest effects at Canton or wher-
ever else we may obtain a settlement,” yet “the first and most important object 
is, neither to impair nor injure our present situation, thereby checking those 
prospects which are decidedly in view.”10 Among the documents assembled by 
Macartney during his preparations was a copy of a diplomatic letter sent to 
Russia by the Qing court in 1789, containing bitter recriminations about the 
Uladzai affair.11
The Macartney embassy appeared to represent a formidable threat to 
Russia, not only because a more northerly port would support a better market 
for furs but also because it would allow the Qing to use the British competition 
as leverage in future disputes. (In fact, there is no evidence Macartney was 
even aware of his mission’s potential threat to Kiakhta.) On October 5, 1792 
(os), the Russian ambassador to the Court of St. James’s, Semën Vorontsov 
(1744–1832), wrote to his brother Aleksandr (1741–1805), who was the head of 
the College of Commerce and was thus responsible for formulating trade pol-
icy: “I would also very much like to [know] what you would tell me about what 
has been done in relation to this country’s embassy to China. I would be very 
angry if it this matter were to be regarded with indifference. If the English suc-
ceed, we will see, but too late, what sort of harm this will do to our commerce.”12 
Already aware of the expanding British ambitions in the Pacific, Catherine II 
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(r. 1762–1796) had begun to plan for contingencies. A Russian expedition with 
the objective of opening trade with Japan, led by Adam Laksman (1766–1806), 
was organized starting in 1791. The original concept involved capturing the 
mouth of the Amur River by force, which would substantially ease any effort at 
trade with the Pacific at the cost of likely war and permanent rupture with the 
Qing. At the same time, Russia began expanding its colonization of Alaska, 
chartering the Russian-American Company during the last years of the cen-
tury.13 But these were merely side projects. At the heart of Catherine’s effort to 
counter the perceived British threat was a direct response, and this was where 
the Jesuits came in.
Though unusual, it was not a wholly arbitrary choice of allies. Russians had 
often had recourse to the Jesuits as informants in the context of relations with 
the Qing. This began as early as the 1670s, when the Russian ambassador 
Nikolai Spafarii (1636–1708) obtained apparently privileged information from 
the famed Jesuit astronomer Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688) during negotia-
tions in Beijing. At any rate, he claimed as much in his official report; historians 
have since raised substantial doubts that Verbiest was even capable of provid-
ing secret intelligence.14 Over the ensuing decades, these relations grew frost-
ier: in 1699, the papal envoy Christoph Ignaz de Guarient attributed suspicions 
against the Jesuits in Russia to fears that they were intending to steal informa-
tion about potential routes to China.15 In the 1730s, however, the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg began to correspond with the Beijing 
Jesuits, both sides being fully aware that such letters had the potential to cast 
official suspicion on the missionaries. Their exchanges remained for the most 
part apolitical, though they did involve the exchange of maps.16
Russia mounted its first real attempt to leverage Jesuit connections for dip-
lomatic purposes in 1755–57, when the envoy Vasilii Bratishchev went to Beijing. 
Conceived as part of a convoluted and largely secret strategy for expanding 
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Russia’s presence in the Pacific, his mission’s goal was primarily to obtain the 
right of navigation on the Amur River, which was mostly in Qing territory and 
which Russian ships had hitherto not had the right to enter.17 The president of 
the Academy of Sciences, Count Kirill Razumovskii (1728–1803), provided 
Bratishchev with recommendation letters to each of the three Jesuit colleges in 
Beijing, which he was to visit in order to deliver correspondence, books, and 
botanical materials from the Academy. The hope was that the Beijing Jesuits, 
whose supposed high standing at court was known throughout Europe from 
publications such as Jean-Baptiste Du Halde’s Description générale de la Chine, 
would use their clout to advance the Russian cause.18 Yet there is no evidence 
that they were asked for their opinion by the Qing court or, indeed, had much 
voice in foreign policy at all, especially in such a sensitive matter. Predictably, 
Bratishchev’s mission was not a success, and the Jesuits’ involvement, which 
was limited to informing him through indirect means of the emperor’s attitude, 
was not of much practical use. Instead, he found a valuable source in the 
Propaganda Fide missionary Sigismondo di San Nicola (1713–1767), to whom he 
brought a letter from his home town of Turin. San Nicola provided important 
information about the emperor’s reception of the Russian proposals, which 
was not an eager one.19
Cooperation with Russia seemed to offer something to the Jesuits as well, 
despite the failure of several past attempts to establish a land route to China 
through Russia. Before his death, the well-known Beijing astronomer and his-
torian Antoine Gaubil (1689–1759) wrote to Superior General Ignazio Visconti 
to express the hope that cultivating Russian goodwill in the Qing context could 
finally lead to the Society’s restoration in the Russian Empire.20 The next 
twenty years, however, brought much more serious problems for the Jesuits, 
pushing any such projects into the background. After being expelled from 
Spain and dissolved in France, the Society of Jesus was abolished worldwide by 
the 1773 breve Dominus ac Redemptor, setting off a vicious internecine rivalry 
among the Catholic missionaries in Beijing.
For Russia, the breve created an opportunity. Catherine II instantly became 
protectress of the Jesuits by refusing to allow the dissolution to take effect in 
Russian territory, including the Livonian and Belarusian lands acquired in the 
first partition of Poland (where the Jesuits had a well-established presence). 
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Though the ex-Jesuits in Beijing still remained outside the Society, it was not 
long before they discovered what Catherine had done. In 1777, the French for-
mer Jesuit and naturalist Pierre-Martial Cibot (1727–1780) wrote to the Academy 
to register his profound gratitude to the empress:
If I have abandoned all my literary connections and apply myself more 
than ever to cultivate the ones I have with you and with the Academy, it 
is because I owe it to the joy I’ve had of being a Jesuit, and […] I will do 
the impossible in order to be able to offer your Triumphant and Generous 
Empress some sort of work which may be an eternal Monument of my 
recognition of the kindnesses with which she honors the Jesuits of her 
lands.21
A number of the Jesuits in Qing territory accepted reenrollment into the 
Society through Belarus, including (allegedly) Bishop Laimbeckhoven of 
Nanjing himself.22 If nothing else, the surviving province could have been a 
powerful source of external support. In 1782, the ex-Jesuit missionary François 
Bourgeois wrote a lengthy missive addressed to “the Fathers of the Society in 
White Russia,” summarizing the post-dissolution controversy and accompa-
nied by a pile of extracts from documents. This highly biased document repre-
sented a clear attempt to persuade the ex-Jesuits’ new allies to take the French 
college’s side in the struggle.23 The strategy worked: in 1785, the Jesuit superior 
wrote back, encouraging Bourgeois to keep firm and equating his opponents in 
Beijing with those who had abandoned the Society in its darkest days.24
Russia now had Jesuits both among its subjects and as potential debtors in 
Beijing. When the Macartney threat appeared, it did not take long for Russian 
high officials to realize the potential value of this strategic resource. A scheme 
to counter the British embassy with the aid of the Jesuits seems to have been 
formulated by either Semën or Aleksandr Vorontsov as early as November or 
December 1791, when Macartney’s embassy was still in the planning stage. 
According to a secret memorandum written in the early nineteenth century 
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and now held in the manuscript collections of the State Historical Museum in 
Moscow, the plan consisted of two options, of which the second was confirmed 
by the empress:
1.  To send to Beijing, under the pretext of border disputes, a smart, hum-
ble, and resourceful man; to send with him some scholars, to disabuse 
the Chinese of the idea that we are all Kropotovs, who unfortunately 
gave them a very poor sense of our degree of enlightenment.25 Beyond 
this, a few Jesuits, in their ordinary civil capacity [v obyknovennom 
grazhdanskom zvanii], who by means of their brethren located in 
Beijing, may be quite useful. Through them, he must secretly persuade 
the Chinese Government of the danger to which it will be subject if it 
once allows the English into their ports, by depicting their behavior in 
India, the destruction of the most beautiful domains of the Great 
Mogul, and that they have equal aims in mind for China, and so on.
The 2nd means consisted in this, that before dispatching the minis-
ter, two Jesuits should be sent with news of this enterprise, who can 
meanwhile preemptively discover who in the Chinese ministry sup-
ports the English, and can underhandedly give them to know of the 
hostile plans of the English against their state as a matter known full 
well in Europe.26
This meant that, as Semën Vorontsov wrote from London in January of 1792, 
the plan for a Japanese expedition needed to be scuttled, as the border con-
quest it required risked “making us lose all hope of reestablishing that com-
merce which we can conduct with them to the great advantage of our country.” 
(In the event the expedition simply proceeded from Okhotsk instead.)27
“As far as the Jesuits are concerned,” Vorontsov wrote, “it is necessary first of all 
to send a trusted person [homme de confiance] to the provincial in White Russia, 
to tell them that there is need of three subjects of his society, capable and healthy, 
to send them to China, so that he can send them immediately to Petersburg, of 
whom two would be sent right away as couriers to Beijing so as not to lose time, 
while the third would go with the ambassador.” They were to receive the same 
compensation as academicians, which amounted to a handsome sum.28 In the 
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spring of 1792 two, not three, Jesuits were sent to St. Petersburg from the Jesuit 
college at Polotsk: Gabriel Gruber (an Austrian engineer who would soon 
become superior general of the Society) (1740–1805), and Manswet Skokowski 
(1751–1798).29 According to the nineteenth-century historian Stanislaw Załęski, 
the Jesuits brought with them an epic poem dedicated to Catherine the Great 
and were duly rewarded for it. After their audience at court, they were shuttled 
to Tsarskoe Selo, where Grand Chancellor Aleksandr Bezborodko (1747–1799) 
explained to them the nature of the secret task that awaited them. Gruber 
declared that he could not go to Beijing without the permission of the pope, 
because the Society of Jesus had been formally suppressed in China; it was also 
necessary first to achieve some sort of understanding with the former Beijing 
Jesuits from a distance, so as not to provoke suspicion at the Qing court. 
Bezborodko—Załęski claims—accepted this reasoning and promised that papal 
permission would be granted.30
A detailed note about the nature of this understanding was composed by 
Aleksandr Vorontsov on June 3, 1792; it may be found in draft form (though por-
tions, judging by the content, may be missing) in the Vorontsov papers at the 
Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, mislabeled as dating to 1778 and filed 
together with two irrelevant documents about Jesuit history.31 It does not men-
tion Gruber’s invocation of the pope, but it does depart from the assumption 
that the Jesuits should write a letter before going to China. Vorontsov reports 
that he has met with Jesuits for the first time and they seem like capable peo-
ple. Yet they do not know whom to write to in Beijing, and not having heard 
about the nature of the mission before leaving home for St. Petersburg, have 
failed to bring materials relevant to China with them. They therefore request to 
be allowed to return to Polotsk and consult their materials, which Vorontsov 
sees no problem with, as long as they set off for Irkutsk immediately after-
wards. In a reply written on June 8, Catherine (via Bezborodko) approved 
Vorontsov’s proposal, as long as the Jesuits composed a project for a Latin letter 
before leaving the capital.32
Although no letter in Latin can be found in Russian archives, Vorontsov’s 
note contains extensive plans for its contents, which reflect the perceptions of 
Russian officialdom about what the Jesuits valued most. Gruber and Skokowski 
were to begin with an invocation of their loyalty to Catherine, “making here a 
greeting [sic] to the Chinese, that despite the various persecutions in other 
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countries, they at least have the consolation of living in peace and prosperity 
in the two greatest empires […] and that this protection [pokrov] gives their 
order a means to obtain its pleasure and consolation through its love of sci-
ence.” The emphasis on science was to be the linchpin of the missive, for the 
next stage was to ask “if their colleagues need any sort of physical or astro-
nomical instruments, which they could easily deliver to them in Beijing.” This 
in turn would open an opportunity to ask about the British embassy and the 
devices it would be bringing. Now they could finally introduce the damning 
evidence about the British role in India: “This nation, being so quick in its com-
mercial and political enterprises, has, in the same part of the world as the 
Chinese state, begun by opening commerce and trading posts in the East 
Indies and finally has ended by capturing the best Indian possessions, so that 
many provinces have abandoned the lawful rule of the Indian Sovereign and 
are already ruled by Englishmen.” Having laid this groundwork, the way lay 
open for an inquiry, “purely out of curiosity,” about the embassy’s likely future 
prospects. At the end, Vorontsov made sure to provide for some flexibility:
To this they might add in their letter, something about their order, and of 
its present condition, as well as about the sciences, whatever they them-
selves find appropriate, and it seems to be not a bad idea to expand this, 
so that the material about the English does not seem to be the main topic 
of the letter but rather to be mentioned in passing.33
This supposedly fraternal letter from one college of Jesuits to another, in other 
words, was an entirely constructed document in which every phrase and sen-
tence was dictated by Russian geopolitical ends and shaped by Russian stereo-
types about Jesuit values and beliefs. Not a word of Vorontsov’s note mentioned 
missionary activity or made reference to the Catholic church at all.
Finding a way to deliver the letter, once written, was not high on Vorontsov’s 
list of priorities. His plan suggested vaguely that “it will be easy to send it from 
here to the acting governor of Irkutsk, instructing him to transfer it, without 
using his name, to the border commissioner, and for the latter to give it to the 
Chinese one, telling him that it was addressed to him from the Jesuits in Polotsk 
with a request to send it along to Beijing.”34 Much more pressing was the need 
to come up with the appropriate gifts with which to equip the future ambas-
sador, once the Jesuits had succeeded in their mission, as he had no doubt they 
would. His brother wrote from London, also on June 3, that “there should be no 
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more consideration of [scientific] instruments, because they will be contempt-
ible [méprisables] compared to those which are being sent from here. For four 
months the most celebrated artists have done nothing else but work for my 
lord Macartney.”35 Yet in fact at that point there was not even any guarantee 
that a Russian embassy would be accepted, still less one equal in grandeur to 
Macartney’s. Catherine and her ministers had built a precarious house of 
cards: the ambassador was to be preceded by Gruber and Skokowski, who first 
needed to receive a response from Beijing to a letter that itself had yet to be 
written and delivered (in addition to a writ of permission from the pontiff). 
Meanwhile, by September 11, Macartney—whose preliminaries had already 
been taken care of—was already sailing to Canton, and time to undermine him 
was running short.
One of the problems with Vorontsov’s postal scenario—as he would have 
discovered had he consulted anyone familiar with the Jesuit correspondence—
was that the missionaries had always specifically instructed their correspon-
dents to avoid Qing-subject middlemen, because of the risk of exposure to 
charges of espionage. A letter was written and sent by express courier to 
Irkutsk, where it was successfully received on August 13. Ivan Pil’, the governor-
general of Eastern Siberia, reported secretly that he had ordered the letter to be 
sent on to Kiakhta and given into the hands of Vasilii Igumnov (1730?–1804), a 
longtime local intelligence agent who maintained extensive friendships and 
contacts in Mongolia.36 Igumnov himself was to tell the Qing officials at Kuren 
(Urga, modern Ulaanbaatar), the Mongolian capital, that the British were send-
ing an embassy and that their plans for the Qing were as nefarious as their his-
tory in India. For some reason, however, when another decree from Catherine 
reached Pil’s desk on November 28, the letter was still in Kiakhta, and the local 
officials there were ordered to send it through the Qing outpost on the other 
side of the border as soon as possible.37 There, the project hit a decisive snag. 
As it turned out, it was not just the Jesuits who were suspicious of receiving 
correspondence through middlemen: the middlemen themselves were wary of 
getting involved. “To my regret,” Pil’ reported on January 30, 1793, “the border 
officer Lieutenant Tiutrin [...] could not persuade the jargūci [the border secre-
tary] to give anything except a refusal.” Tiutrin noted the jargūci’s “embarrassed 
expression,” his “politic smile,” and his announcement that this request was 
“novel and unprecedented, with which he does not dare to importune the 
ambans [here, Qing Mongolian officials] […] and that his, the jargūci’s, request 
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would seem strange to the ambans, and it is unknown how they could receive 
it, unless he sends to Beijing individually, which his government would know 
about and from which he would not escape the most dangerous conse-
quences.”38 Attached to Pil’s report in the archives of the imperial cabinet is a 
letter from Gruber in Polotsk, dated 14 July 1792 and addressed to “Your 
Excellency” (likely either Bezborodko or one of the Vorontsovs). In it, Gruber 
appears to be making active and detailed plans to purchase a substantial quan-
tity of scientific devices in London, even though arranging anything with the 
Jesuits in time to frustrate the British was now out of the question. The purpose 
of the letter is entirely unclear from the text.39
Igumnov’s trip to Urga in the fall of 1792 may have had a little more success. 
According to the nineteenth-century memorandum, the reference to the 
British in India “made such a strong impression on the ambans that the next 
day after their conversation they sent a clerk with the protocol and asked him 
to correct the names of the lands conquered by the English and the name of 
their ambassador.”40 In 1802, Igumnov was given a promotion on the basis 
of his alleged role in undermining Macartney.41 Yet the Qing court learned of 
Igumnov’s visit only on March 1, 1793, and the official record says only that 
“Captain Wasili” came out of courtesy to inform the ambans that England was 
sending an embassy—with no overtones of danger or alarm.42 Of course, from 
the British point of view the Macartney embassy was a spectacular failure, its 
only tangible result being the Qianlong emperor’s famously condescending 
edict dismissing European goods. Matthew Mosca has pointed to Macartney’s 
sense that he was being treated with suspicion due to British activities in 
India—indeed, he felt this was the main reason for the embassy’s lack of suc-
cess—and perhaps the Russian conspiracy was one of the sources of Qing dis-
trust.43 In 1805, the Russian ambassador Count Golovkin (1762–1846) seems to 
have been under the impression that the attempt to use India to discredit the 
British had achieved its goal. “Because this expedient was already resorted to 
successfully by our court in 1793,” Golovkin wrote, “it should now be used with 
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moderation, so as not to let the Chinese suspect that we blacken [the reputa-
tion] of others out of envy or greed.44
Yet there appears to be no evidence in Qing sources that either Igumnov or 
any correspondence with the Jesuits (if it had taken place) had influenced the 
outcome one way or the other. Actually, from the Qing perspective the embassy 
seems to have been a qualified success. An envoy had come from foreign lands 
to present tribute, he was received hospitably and rewarded richly, and his 
departure took place without incident, though court ceremonial had been vio-
lated in a few important respects.45 Whether the conspiracy was successful 
may thus be a fundamentally unanswerable question. Having only an incom-
plete sense of what lay on the other side of the Himalayas, it was hard for the 
Qianlong emperor to imagine that a country of which he had barely heard 
could ever threaten his sovereignty. Whether a new and untested tributary 
should be granted trade concessions was an entirely different question.46
Gruber’s letter was, in the end, delivered personally by Igumnov, who was 
assigned to escort a group of Orthodox missionaries and students, part of the 
Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, to Beijing in 1794–95. As he did throughout his 
four-decade intelligence career, Igumnov kept a secret journal of his encoun-
ters and conversations, including numerous meetings with the Beijing ex- 
Jesuits and other Catholic missionaries (whom he seems to have known from 
prior visits to the capital). The entry for January 12 records that “I gave two 
sables of second quality in the name of the [Russian] archimandrite to the 
Jesuit [José] Bernard[o de Almeida (1728–1805)] of the Southern Church, who 
was the translator for the English envoys and is familiar with all of the circum-
stances relating to them, in hopes of receiving a response to the secret letter 
that was sent.”47 The journal does not mention the receipt of any response.
Nonetheless, Igumnov’s three-hour-long conversations with Almeida and 
the French ex-Jesuit Louis de Poirot (1735–1813) (conducted through transla-
tors in Manchu and Latin), as well as his local Mongol informants (with whom 
he spoke Mongol directly) left nothing to the imagination with respect to the 
conduct, goals, and the eventual fate of the Macartney embassy. Over “tea and 
snacks,” Almeida provided him with a four-point list of Macartney’s requests, 
70 Afinogenov
journal of jesuit studies 2 (2015) 56-76
<UN>
48 Ibid., l7ff.
49 RGIA, f. 1374, op. 2, d. 1596.
50 Bartenev, Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova, IX:327–28.
an account of the gifts he presented, and some sense of the surveillance to 
which the embassy was subjected in Beijing. Further, he also promised that 
“out of friendship with the captain” he would report on the upcoming Dutch 
embassy as well. Poirot (along with the Lazarist Nicholas Raux [1754–1801]) 
remarked on the Dutch embassy, offered the lack of a proper kowtow as an 
explanation for Macartney’s failure and appeared to agree with Igumnov that 
the Russian trade was more advantageous for the Qing than the British, because 
Russians imported cloth and other goods while the British exchanged their 
exports for gold and silver. Later, both Almeida and Raux provided Igumnov 
with inside information on the course of the Dutch embassy, which left Beijing 
while the Russian agent was still there. (A merchant in Igumnov’s party was 
also allowed to spy on the Dutch while disguised as a Chinese man, though 
without much success.) All in all, Igumnov recorded six meetings with the ex-
Jesuits over the course of five months.48 In the ensuing years, the members of 
the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing maintained an extensive friend-
ship with them, which included the sharing of intelligence, until the Qing 
court warned them to cease all contacts with the Russians and mutual visits 
within the city were halted.49
The grand conspiracy thought up in by the Vorontsovs and the empress, 
then, did not succeed in any of its details despite the ultimate accomplishment 
of its (highly overdetermined) main objective, Lord Macartney’s decisive dip-
lomatic reversal. Igumnov’s trip to Urga, whether or not it had actually resulted 
in a growing Qing consciousness of threat, evinced no request or permit for a 
full embassy to Beijing. Gruber and Skokowski’s voyage from Polotsk to St. 
Petersburg produced no functioning sustained correspondence, still less a 
physical mission to China. Yet the project was not completely abandoned 
when Macartney returned in defeat. (Vorontsov wrote of the failure from 
London in July 1794, with Macartney not even in England yet).50 In various 
forms, it continued to shape Russian policies toward the Qing for the next 
decade. After all, Russia’s perception of the British commercial threat had not 
abated despite the embassy’s setback—quite the opposite—and the geopoliti-
cal crisis produced by the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon was rais-
ing the stakes even higher.
In 1803, Emperor Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) decided finally to send the major 
embassy that had been in the works for so long and which had been so key to 
the Vorontsov project. Not only would it be the first Russian diplomatic mission 
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to Beijing in forty years, it would be the first since the 1720s to be headed by a 
major aristocrat endowed with the full authority to negotiate on behalf of the 
Russian Empire: Count Iurii Golovkin. Golovkin’s instructions were intended to 
be a real answer to Macartney. He was to secure the opening of trade on the 
northwest borders of the Qing Empire, obtain permission (hitherto refused) for 
Russia to trade at Canton, and most importantly, finally persuade the emperor 
to open the Amur to Russian ships. The result would be to shore up Russia’s 
commercial presence in the Qing lands as well as to provide a much cheaper 
supply route to the increasingly significant settlements of Russian America, all 
key ingredients for resisting British competition in the Pacific. Golovkin’s suite 
consisted of hundreds of people, including translators in Mongol, Manchu, 
Chinese, and Latin as well as a number of scholars and natural scientists. The 
embassy proved to be even more of a humiliating disaster for Russia than 
Macartney’s had been for Britain. Due to a dispute over kowtow protocol and 
the size of his entourage—exasperated by an overanxious Qing administrator 
in Mongolia—Golovkin was forced to return to Irkutsk in 1805 rather than 
compromise the honor of the empire. He had not even succeeded in entering 
China proper.51
In the wake of this debacle, Russian intelligence authorities tried to make 
use of the next rotating shift of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission to make con-
tact with the former Beijing Jesuits. The instructions given to the mission’s 
escorting agent, Semën Pervushin—though oddly misinformed about the suc-
cess of Macartney’s embassy—in 1807 specified that he was to
Get to know and live in friendly interaction with the Jesuits, who were 
known by the late collegiate assessor Igumnov in his repeated visits to 
Beijing. But do not take them into your confidence, following the pru-
dence that must be the guide of all conduct, in the obtaining of informa-
tion needed by the government. They can be useful in doing so. It is 
desirable that you list the entire Jesuit society by name, their type of 
activity, their influence on government affairs, inclination towards one or 
the other European state, and finally, attempt to determine whether they 
respect the superior (general) of this order in Russia.52
Further, the instructions gave Pervushin detailed guidance for conversations. 
Beyond being merely cautious of possible British influence and bribery, in 
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conversations with ex-Jesuits the agent would “observing exterior calm, subtly 
extract needed information, and not immediately or suddenly so that they 
may not guess at what you need.” He was provided with a few sample conver-
sational scenarios as illustration.53 Though it is likely the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs did not know this, a register of all the Beijing ex-Jesuits would be brief 
indeed: by this point only Frs. Poirot, de Grammont (1736–1812?), and Panzi 
(1768–1812?) remained among the living, and were unlikely to be of much use 
or influence. By the time the mission made its return journey in 1819, all of 
them were long dead.54
As part of the embassy preparations, Alexander revived another element of 
the Vorontsov project: the Russian Jesuit mission to China. In June 1799 (and 
again in 1800), Gabriel Gruber had sent a letter to Emperor Paul in which he 
begged for his support in obtaining a papal breve granting permission for the 
Jesuits to operate outside the boundaries of the Russian Empire. He pointed 
out that such a breve had already been asked for in the context of the China 
project, “attempted twice,” “because for the complete success of the Embassy, 
it was necessary for me to appear and act as a Jesuit, which could not take place 
without a breve.” But Pope Pius VI (r. 1775–1799) had died before the final breve 
could be obtained, so Paul’s involvement was necessary in order to restart the 
effort.55 In 1801, as a direct result of Gruber’s petition—and hence of the China 
project—Pius VII (r. 1800–1823) issued the breve Catholicae fidei, which would 
eventually become the foundation for the Jesuit restoration worldwide.
Gruber continued his support for the China project under the new emperor 
Alexander I. In 1803, the Polotsk Jesuits received a letter from Louis de Poirot, 
who described the dire state of the Beijing mission and asked to be readmitted 
into the Society.56 The Golovkin embassy offered the chance to rebuild the 
Jesuit community in Beijing while doing the Russian government a major ser-
vice. According to the memoirs of a participant in the Golovkin embassy, 
Gruber had enthusiastically offered Jesuit assistance to the court during the 
embassy’s preparations, though his death at the end of 1805 prevented much 
further progress. The memoirist claims that “the general of the order, through 
his missionaries, who then had significant influence in Beijing, prepared the 
Chinese government for our cordial reception.” Ironically, this support now 
made the embassy itself suspect. “No,” he observes, “Russia should not have 
 73Jesuit Conspirators And Russia’s East Asian Fur Trade, 1791–1807
journal of jesuit studies 2 (2015) 56-76
<UN>
57 Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XIX v., 766.
58 Ibid., 93–94.
59 Andrei Maslennikov, “Osnovanie struktur rimsko-katolicheskoi tserkvi v Sibiri,” in Marek 
Inglot, ed., Rossiia i iezuity, 1772–1820 (Moscow: Nauka, 2006), 237–59.
60 arsi, Sin. 1001-III, 50–59.
61 arsi, Russ. 1016, 259–262; Sin. 1001-III, 72.
expected a satisfactory conclusion to a matter begun under the oversight of a 
Pole [Adam Czartoryski (1770–1861), then the head of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs] and some Roman Catholic monks.”57 Meanwhile, Czartoryski himself 
argued that “the cooperation of the Jesuits in Beijing, who are respected and 
have connections with highly-placed people there” was “the chief means” of 
securing the embassy’s goals.58
Gruber’s assistance took the form of recommending the Jesuit scientists 
Giovanni Grassi (1775–1849), Norbert Korsak (1773–1846), and Jan Stürmer (the 
latter a lay brother) to be sent as missionaries to Beijing. In order not to violate 
precedent—Jesuits had always traveled via Canton—the three of them had to 
make their way to Macau by sea rather than joining the embassy on land.59 
Once they arrived in Beijing, they were to focus on gathering intelligence and 
spreading their influence to aid Golovkin in his work, among other things:
Because it is important that the Ambassador be aware of the Chinese 
Ministry’s disposition towards him, of the way he is regarded by various 
people, and of the degree of success on which he can count, it is necessary 
that the Jesuits advise him of the means to keep apprised of everything 
which takes place in the Chinese bureaus relative to his mission, so that 
he may be well-informed about this. Also, they must find ways of using 
indirect approaches to deliver to highly-placed men all sorts of insinua-
tions and news which they believe are suited to Russia’s interests and 
which may contribute to the Ambassador’s success in the negotiations.60
The letter to Korsak and his party Gruber had drafted before he died sketched 
out these requirements and framed them as justified both by loyalty to Russia 
and to “harmony” between the two empires, though later versions omitted this 
(it is unclear why).61
In 1806, the new Jesuit superior general Tadeusz Brzozowski (1749–1820) 
composed a letter to Poirot and Luigi Cipolla (1736–1805?), to be sent with the 
Orthodox missionaries through Irkutsk. Brzozowski related the news of 
Gruber’s death, reassured Poirot and Cipolla that some 330 Jesuits survived 
under Alexander I’s protection, and promised that Korsak, Grassi, and Stürmer 
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were on their way to Beijing. The Jesuits in Russia were certain that papal sup-
port would be obtained with the help of Cardinal Tommaso Arezzo (1756–
1833). As the St. Petersburg college’s Diarium for 1806 puts it, since this would 
be “a great boon to the Russian Emperor,” “who would not think that the deal 
was to be concluded? Certainly the Father General was of this opinion.”62
Grassi’s autobiographical account tells the long story of their travails.63 First, 
the three Jesuits were summoned to St. Petersburg, like Gruber and Skokowski 
before them, without knowing where they were going. After a voyage overland to 
Copenhagen, they traveled to London. Here they found their first setback: not a 
single ship was willing to carry them as passengers to Macau. In a moment of 
supreme irony, they were forced to turn to Lord Macartney for help, but even his 
intervention failed to secure them a vessel. Moreover, they were beginning to be 
beset by much more prosaic doubts. Death by shipwreck was a common fate for 
seventeenth-century Jesuit missionaries to East Asia; Grassi and his colleagues 
were evidently reluctant to accept this sort of martyrdom. In July 1805, Brzozowski 
chided Korsak for his faint-heartedness: “if you return from London to Russia,” he 
wrote, “and follow the embassy after two or three months, when you were sup-
posed to precede it, this would of course be a shame the blemish of which would 
never be removed from our name at court.”64 The next year, when Golovkin’s 
prospects had dimmed, Brzozowski encouraged Korsak to continue his mission, 
follow in the footsteps of his illustrious Beijing Jesuit predecessors, and “pru-
dently assist not the current Embassy but the future interests of the State: this 
was done by our Foreign fathers, not Russians such as Father Gerbillon, Father 
Parennin, Father Pereyra [Jesuits who had been involved in Russo-Qing negotia-
tions at Nerchinsk and after]: what will the subjects of a gracious Monarch, who 
maintains us genially and under whose wings we are calmly living, not do?”65
Undaunted by their failure in London, then, they traveled onward to Lisbon. 
In the meantime, the prospects for new missionaries in Beijing had darkened: 
Qing authorities caught an Italian missionary named Adeodato di San Agostino 
with an illicit map on his way from Beijing to Macau, triggering a widespread 
persecution.66 But the more decisive blow came in 1807 from the papal office of 
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Propaganda Fide. In deciding on the credentials to be issued to the missionar-
ies, the Propaganda needed to reconcile the opposition of Catholic states like 
Portugal to the project with the fact that its backer was a schismatic state, 
albeit one friendly to the papacy.67 When the missionaries’ credential letters 
were finally issued, they authorized the new China missionaries to travel only 
as secular priests, not Jesuits, and placed them under the authority of the vic-
ars apostolic, the Propaganda’s missionary bishops. This was unacceptable 
both to the Jesuits and to the Russian government. The Society of Jesus had 
struggled against the vicars’ authority for as long as the Propaganda Fide had 
had a presence in China, while the Russian government saw no point to sup-
porting a mission it could not oversee directly. Brzozowski wrote in despera-
tion to seek the help of José Pignatelli and Giovanni Avogadro, but to no avail.68 
Arguing that the orders in fact entitled the Propaganda Fide to redirect the 
Jesuits anywhere it wished, as it was likely to do, in 1810 he wrote to Alexander 
to formally cancel the mission.69 The three Jesuits were sent back to England, 
whence in 1810 Grassi departed for a long and illustrious career in the United 
States. There, he proved crucial for the survival and flourishing of Georgetown 
College.70 In a letter to his future successors, Brzozowski described the dis-
heartening circumstances of the mission’s failure and encouraged future supe-
riors general to avoid any mention of the 9,000 rubles the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had wasted on the project in their discussions with the court.71
For the former Jesuits in China, the failure of the Russian project sounded 
the death knell, although Poirot and his remaining comrades were reenrolled 
in 1806.72 In fact, even then may have already been too late. In 1808, Poirot 
wrote that the new arrivals would have been well accommodated “if only they 
had come five or six years earlier.” Now the anti-Christian persecution and the 
inroads of the French Lazarists had taken their toll. To carry this final letter to 
Europe, Poirot relied on the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, to whose departing 
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members he gave several copies for further security.73 In 1813, Poirot died, end-
ing two and a half centuries of Jesuit presence in China. Only in 1841 would 
they return to Qing lands in force.
The story of the Russian conspiracy against the British in China offers a 
powerful demonstration of the value of a non-Jesuit perspective for Jesuit his-
torians and a Jesuit point of view for those working outside of Jesuit history. 
Without the latter, the complicated ecclesiastical politics surrounding the fate 
of the former and hoped-for future Beijing Jesuits would be entirely opaque. 
But without the former, it is impossible to understand the extraordinary 
lengths to which Russian officials went in promoting the establishment of a 
new mission by a foreign faith in a country where their influence was so weak. 
In the absence of Russian administrative sources, the lacunae in Jesuit accounts 
of these events become unfillable. Together, the two perspectives reveal a long-
concealed story of espionage and conspiracy at the margins of European 
empire.
